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ABSTRACT
Humans typically combine linguistic and nonlinguistic information to comprehend
emotions. We adopted an emotion identification Stroop task to investigate how
different channels interact in emotion communication. In experiment 1, synonyms
of “happy” and “sad” were spoken with happy and sad prosody. Participants had
more difficulty ignoring prosody than ignoring verbal content. In experiment 2,
synonyms of “happy” and “sad” were spoken with happy and sad prosody, while
happy or sad faces were displayed. Accuracy was lower when two channels
expressed an emotion that was incongruent with the channel participants had to
focus on, compared with the cross-channel congruence condition. When
participants were required to focus on verbal content, accuracy was significantly
lower also when prosody was incongruent with verbal content and face. This
suggests that prosody biases emotional verbal content processing, even when
conflicting with verbal content and face simultaneously. Implications for multimodal
communication and language evolution studies are discussed.
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During emotive spoken communication, listeners
use multiple sources of information spanning from
verbal content to prosodic modulation, pragmatic
context, facial expression, and gestures. In order to
improve our understanding of emotion processing
in spoken interaction, it is essential to bridge the
study of each of these informative dimensions
with empirical research on how they integrate and
interact with each other during multimodal
communication.
Research has shown that when emotional stimuli
are conveyed only in one channel, emotion recog-
nition is more accurate in the visual modality than
in the auditory modality (Paulmann & Pell, 2011).
However, in emotion communication, multiple chan-
nels can also strongly reinforce each other (Grand-
jean, Baenziger, & Scherer, 2006; Paulmann & Pell,
2011; Wilson & Wharton, 2006). Studies have shown
that the integration of facial expression and
prosody guides the perception of the speaker’s
emotional state (Belin, Fecteau, & Bédard, 2004; Cam-
panella & Belin, 2007; Massaro & Egan, 1996). The
integration of different sources of information in
emotion comprehension has a relevant social func-
tion, as multiple emotional cues can be employed
as appeals to appropriate behaviours, and ultimately,
to regulate interpersonal interactions (Fischer &
Roseman, 2007; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead,
2004). Furthermore, the ability to use multiple chan-
nels to convey socially relevant information such as
basic emotions might have provided adaptive advan-
tages for the first hominins, paving the emergence of
verbal language on a phylogenetic level (Mithen,
2005; Morton, 1977).
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Generally, audio and visual channels of emotion
communication are integrated following two different
dynamics: priming or simultaneous interaction.
Numerous experiments have established that the
verbal content and/or the prosodic modulation of seg-
mental units prime the interpretation of a following
target word (Nygaard & Lunders, 2002) or facial
expression (Pell, 2002, 2005; Pell, Jaywant, Monetta,
& Kotz, 2011; Schwartz & Pell, 2012) in an emotion-
congruent manner. Moreover, it has been shown
that emotional prosody also biases memory of affec-
tive words, again in an emotion-congruent manner
(Schirmer, 2010; Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 2002).
In emotion communication, linguistic and nonlin-
guistic channels can simultaneously express the same
content or different content. Think, for instance
about when someone says “I’m sad!”, but does so in
a happy prosody. Here, both verbal content and
prosody express specific but conflicting emotions.
The question, then, is: Which communicative
channel are we most biased towards in identifying
emotional content?
With the aim of exploring how communicative
channels determine the degree and the direction of
interference in emotion processing, much research
has applied a Stroop-like task (MacLeod & MacDonald,
2000; Stroop, 1935). For instance, Stenberg, Wiking,
and Dahl (1998) reported spontaneous attentional
biases for emotional face processing over verbal
content with emotional valence. In an emotional
prosody–face Stroop task, De Gelder and Vroomen
(2000) showed a bidirectional bias. The Stroop task
paradigm has been applied to examine linguistic, cul-
tural, and age biases in the interpretation of emotions
conveyed by incongruent prosody and verbal content.
For instance, Kitayama and Ishii (2002) have shown
that English speakers are more attuned to the
emotional valence of verbal contents, while Japanese
speakers are more strongly influenced by prosody. In a
follow-up study, Ishii, Reyes, and Kitayama (2003)
found that Tagalog–English bilinguals in the Philip-
pines showed an attentional bias for prosody regard-
less of the language used, a result that points in the
direction of a cultural rather than a linguistic effect
on emotion processing. Cultural effects on brain
response to emotional expressions have been
described in Liu, Rigoulot, and Pell (2015), who
found that English native speakers are more attuned
to emotional cues in the face rather than in the
voice, when compared to Chinese native speakers.
Wurm, Labouvie-Vief, Aycock, Rebucal, and Koch
(2004), who adopted an emotional Stroop paradigm
to investigate ageing effects in emotion recognition,
found that older individuals are slower in processing
emotion words that have high arousal intensity
when prosody and verbal content mismatch. Finally,
recent work in brain research showed sex differences
(Schirmer & Kotz, 2003) and the activation of distinct
brain areas (Grimshaw, 1998; Schirmer & Kotz, 2006)
in processing emotions through interacting prosody
and verbal contents. However, to our knowledge, no
studies have analysed the interaction between more
than two communication channels in conveying
emotions simultaneously.
Our goal was to examine the relative saliency of
multiple communication channels within an emotion
identification task. To this end, we developed two
Stroop experiments that address three issues in our
understanding of emotion communication. First,
although previous research using the Stroop task
paradigm has examined the interaction of words
and prosody in the expression of emotional valences,
no behavioural Stroop experiment has ever combined
emotional prosody with verbal content denoting
emotions (for instance, “happy” and “sad”). For
instance, Ishii et al. (2003) adopted verbal contents
judged as pleasant or unpleasant (e.g. “refreshment”
or “warm”), spoken with pleasant or unpleasant
prosody. Similarly, Schirmer and Kotz (2003) adopted
positive, neutral, or negative verbal contents, which
were spoken with positive, neutral, or negative
prosody. Contrasting emotional prosody with verbal
contents (both referring to discrete emotional cat-
egories such as happy and sad) is advantageous in
that it can help improve the understanding of how
the verbal channel interacts with other expressive
channels in recruiting cognitive resources for proces-
sing discrete emotions (see Bower, 1987), adding to
the literature on the multi-channel interaction in pro-
cessing dimensional emotions such as positive and
negative valence. Furthermore, this design represents
a more accurate variant of the original Stroop task, in
which words denoting colours were contrasted with
the actual colour of the text. Hence, to address this
gap in the literature, we designed a Stroop experiment
directly contrasting verbal content, prosody and, in
experiment 2, also facial expression – as dimensions
that interact to communicate the emotions happy
and sad (Figure 1). We reasoned that using emotions
as denotations that can be “transposed” across com-
munication channels would enable a fine-tuned
measurement of the interdimensional saliency effects.



































A second issue addressed by this work is that,
although numerous Stroop experiments have
focused on the relative role of verbal content and
prosody in emotional speech processing, the out-
comes of these studies do not always converge.
Some of the Stroop experiments on emotion identifi-
cation showed a bias towards the verbal content
(Ishii et al., 2003), others claimed a bias towards
prosody (Schirmer & Kotz, 2003), and still others
failed to find any interference effects between
prosody and verbal content (Wurm & Douglas, 1996).
The resulting confusion warrants further exploration.
Thus, in experiment 1, we investigated the relative sal-
iency of prosody and verbal content in an emotion
identification task, directly contrasting emotional con-
gruence within these two channels.
Finally, as described above, much attention has
been dedicated to the interference between two com-
munication channels. With the aim of capturing more
of the complexity associated with real-life interactions,
we added facial expression as a third communicative
channel in experiment 2. Specifically, experiment 2
was designed to assess how prosody, verbal content,
and facial expression interact in emotional communi-
cation. We predicted that prosody would be more
salient than verbal content and facial expression in
an emotion identification task. Our prediction was
built on previous studies showing that emotional
prosody guides visual attention to emotional faces
(Brosch, Grandjean, Sander, & Scherer, 2009; Rigoulot
& Pell, 2012, but see Paulmann, Titone & Pell, 2012)
and the perception of emotional verbal content
(Nygaard, Herold, & Namy, 2009).
Experiment 1
Method and material
Participants. Twenty German native speakers (10
females, mean age = 22.65, SD = 3.89) were recruited
at the Ruhr-University of Bochum. The experimental
design adopted for this study was approved by the
Ruhr-University of Bochum ethical review panel in
accordance with the Helsinki Declaration. All partici-
pants gave written informed consents.
Selected stimuli description. In order to ensure that
the emotional content of each stimulus was unequivo-
cal across channels, for experiment 1 we adopted
stimuli that were recognised as expressing the
emotion “happy” or “sad” by at least 90% of a group
of 24 participants in a previous stimulus validation
experiment (Appendix 1). Here, respondents were
asked to identify the emotion conveyed by each
stimulus in a two-choice task (happy or sad), and to
rate the emotional intensity of each stimulus on a
7-point Likert scale (0 = not intense, 6 = very intense).
In order to keep the level of emotional intensity
balanced across channels within each experimental
trial, thus avoiding processing asymmetries across
channels within each trial, only stimuli with a compar-
able level of emotional intensity were included in the
same trial (r = .803, p < .001). The duration of the
spoken stimuli is reported in Table 1.
Figure 1. Representation of the study concept. The emotions happy and sad are used as denotations, which are communicated via multiple
channels simultaneously. The aim of this study is to address the relative saliency of multiple communicative channels within an emotion identi-
fication Stroop task.
Table 1. Duration (milliseconds) of the spoken stimuli used in
experiments 1 and 2.
Spoken stimuli Mean Standard deviation
Synonyms of “happy” 757.733 117.565
Synonyms of “sad” 787.701 194.741



































Verbal content. The stimuli selected for inclusion in
the experiment consisted of two semantic sets: 16
German synonyms of “happy” and 16 German syno-
nyms of “sad” (Appendix 2).
Prosody. For each of the two semantic sets selected
for inclusion in the experiment, 8 verbal contents were
spoken with happy prosody and 8 were spoken with
sad prosody, for a total of 32 spoken items. Words
spoken by four speakers (two males and two females)
were selected based on the ratings made during
the stimulus validation experiment (Appendix 1). The
number of happy and sad verbal contents spoken by
males and females in each emotional prosody was
equal (Appendix 2).
Procedure. The experimental interface was created
in PsycoPy (version 1.80.03; Peirce, 2007). Participants
were individually tested in a quite laboratory, sitting
at around 60 cm from an 18.5′′ monitor. The entire
procedure was computerised. Stimuli were played
binaurally over Bayerdynamic DT990 pro headphones.
Prior to starting the experiment, instructions were dis-
played on the screen and, in order to familiarise with
the experimental procedure, participants ran four
practice trials. Here, participants learned to identify
the emotion conveyed by prosody while ignoring
verbal content when the instruction “Prosody” pre-
ceded the trial (prosody task), and identify the
emotion conveyed by verbal content while ignoring
prosody when the instruction was “Word” (verbal
content task).
The experiment consisted of 64 trials: 32 trials
were played two times, each time with the instruction
to focus on one emotion communication channel (32
with focus on prosody and 32 with focus on the
verbal content). The order of trials was fully random-
ised across participants. Since the emotion expressed
by each channel varied across trials, participants
could not build any expectation on the exact combi-
nation of emotion conveyed by verbal content and
prosody. Furthermore, by randomising the order of
the channel that participants were instructed to
focus on, they were prevented from being able to
anticipate which channel they would have to
ignore, and thus, from creating strategies to block
unnecessary information. Responses were given by
pressing one of two response keys that corresponded
to two response options: the down arrow for “sad”
and the up arrow for “happy”. Participants were
asked to respond as quickly as possible without sacri-
ficing accuracy in judgment. Response time was
measured in milliseconds from the onset of each
stimulus. The inter-trial interval was 1500 ms. All stat-
istical analyses were performed using SPSS for Mac
OS X version 20.
Results and discussion
We first report the analysis of reaction times, followed
by the analysis of accuracy data. The descriptive stat-
istics for reaction times and accuracy are reported in
Table 2.
Reaction time. Only correct responses were
included in the analyses of reaction times. Overall,
responses were very accurate (mean percentage
correct = 94.5%, SD = 6.7%). Mean reaction times
are displayed in Figure 2(a). A linear regression
model was used within a repeated measures
general linear model framework, to compare
overall response times across and within exper-
imental conditions. Task (prosody/verbal content)
and congruence condition (congruent/incongru-
ent) were entered as within-subject predictors.
Reaction times were entered as the dependent
variable.
The model revealed a significant main effect of task
(Wald χ2 (1) = 24.655, p < .001, d =−0.57), a significant
main effect of congruence condition (Wald χ2 (1) =
10.865, p = .001, d =−0.36), and no significant inter-
action between task and congruence condition
(Wald χ2 (1) = 0.274, p = .601).
These results provide evidence that in the prosody
task, emotions were identified faster than in the verbal




condition Min Max Mean
Standard
deviation Min Max Mean
Standard
deviation
Prosody Congruent 932.596 1522.089 1274.635 154.192 87.5 100 96.562 4.744
Incongruent 1006.937 1622.102 1325.659 181.348 75 100 94.375 7.560
Verbal
content
Congruent 1019.118 1599.955 1358.390 165.260 93.75 100 98.125 2.938
Incongruent 1176.043 1722.434 1431.094 147.882 75 100 89.062 7.275



































content task, in both congruence conditions. This
suggests that prosody facilitates more rapid emotional
understanding than verbal content. If collapsed across
tasks, incongruent channels elicited slower responses
than congruent ones overall. This is likely due in part
to the fact that prosody and verbal content typically
match in listeners’ experience. In addition, faster reac-
tion times on congruent trials might be caused by the
use of prosody as a cue to word meaning (Kotz, Meyer,
& Paulmann, 2006; Nygaard et al., 2009; Wildgruber,
Ackermann, Kreifelts, & Ethofer, 2006).
Accuracy. Mean percentages of correct responses
are displayed in Figure 2(b). The same model we
used to analyse reaction times as a function of task
and congruence condition was applied, with the
only difference being that the percentages of correct
responses were entered as the dependent variable.
The model revealed a significant main effect of task
[Wald χ2 (1) = 11.250, p = .001, d = 0.28], a significant
main effect of congruence condition (Wald χ2 (1) =
18.202, p < .001, d = 0.90), and a significant interaction
between task and congruence condition (Wald χ2 (1)
= 17.410, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons were con-
ducted within each task separately, using the sequen-
tial Bonferroni correction procedure (Holm, 1979). This
analysis revealed a significant difference between con-
gruence conditions within the verbal content task
(Wald χ2 (1) = 44.380, p < .001, d = 1.65), and no signifi-
cant difference between congruence conditions in the
prosody task (Wald χ2 (1) = 1.604, p = .205).
These results provide evidence that in the prosody
task, emotions were identified more accurately than in
the verbal content task. If collapsed across tasks,
incongruent channels elicited overall more incorrect
responses than congruent ones. Pairwise comparisons
computed within each task separately revealed that
channels’ incongruence within the verbal content
task (but not within the prosody task) elicits signifi-
cantly more incorrect responses than when the two
channels are congruent. These results suggest that
prosodic content is more salient than verbal content
in emotion processing.
Experiment 2
Findings from experiment 1 suggest that in an emotional
Stroop task, prosody is more salient than verbal content.
In order to explore the interaction of prosody and verbal
content with face in emotion communication, we
designed a three-dimensional Stroop task.
Figure 2. Experiment 1 – (a) Reaction times for the prosody task and the verbal content task averaged across participants. (b) Percentage of
correct answers for the prosody task and the verbal content task averaged across participants. Results are shown separately for each congruence
condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.




































Participants. Twenty German native speakers (10
females, mean age = 22.2, SD = 3.87) were recruited
at the Ruhr-University of Bochum.
Selected stimuli description
Verbal content and prosody stimuli were identical to
those used in Experiment 1. The face stimuli consisted
of colour photographs of a facial expression posed by
two male and two female actors in a previous study
(Pell, 2002) and were obtained through personal com-
munication with the first author of that study. The
faces used in experiment 2 were accurately recog-
nised as conveying the emotion “happy” or “sad” by
at least 90% of the participants in the stimulus vali-
dation experiment (Appendix 1). Here, as for the
verbal content and prosody stimuli used in exper-
iment 1, the respondents were asked to identify the
emotion conveyed by each stimulus in a two-choice
task (happy or sad), and to rate the emotional intensity
of each stimulus on a 7-point Likert scale (0 = not
intense, 6 = very intense). The selected happy and
sad faces were equal in number (n = 16 per emotion,
4 for each actor). Spoken words were matched with
individual faces posed by a member of the same
sex. For each voice, four faces (two happy and two
sad) posed by two actors of the same sex were
selected. Care was taken that the level of emotional
intensity across communication channels was of com-
parable strength. In order to keep the level of
emotional intensity balanced across channels within
each experimental trial, only stimuli with a compar-
able level of intensity were included in the same
trial, as indicated by a Pearson’s correlation coefficient
(verbal content/face: r = .715, p < .001; verbal content/
prosody: r = .803, p < .001; face/prosody: r = .760,
p < .001).
Procedure. The setting of the experiment, interface,
response procedure, and timings were identical to
experiment 1. Within each experimental trial, a face
was displayed while the spoken word was played.
Specifically, the onset and offset of spoken words
and faces were identical in each trial. In order to fam-
iliarise with the experimental procedure, participants
ran eight practice trials. In this familiarisation phase,
participants learned to identify the emotion conveyed
by prosody, while ignoring verbal content and face
when the instruction “Prosody” preceded the trial
(prosody task), to identify the emotion conveyed by
the verbal content, while ignoring prosody and face
when the instruction “Word” preceded the trial
(verbal content task), and to identify the emotion con-
veyed by the face, while ignoring prosody and verbal
content when the instruction “Face” preceded the trial
(face task). Congruence patterns were such that in
each trial, two channels were congruent and the
remaining one was incongruent, resulting in the fol-
lowing congruence conditions: congruent prosody–
verbal content, congruent face–verbal content, and
congruent prosody–face. In a fourth condition, all
three channels were congruent (the cross-channel
congruence control). Across trials, the channel that
participants were instructed to attend to could be
either one of the congruent channels or the incongru-
ent channel. By comparing each condition against the
cross-channel congruence control within each task,
this design enabled the examination of how interfer-
ence from two emotionally congruent channels
affects a third incongruent channel in emotion
processing.
Experiment 2 consisted of 96 trials: 32 trials were
presented three times, each time with the instruction
to focus on one of the three communication channels
(32 with focus on prosody, 32 with focus on the
verbal content, and 32 focus on the face). As in exper-
iment 1, in order to prevent participants from build-
ing any expectation on the exact combination of
emotion conveyed by each channel, we adopted an
event-based design, in which the order of trials was
fully randomised across tasks and congruence
conditions.
Results and discussion
As for experiment 1, we first report the analysis of
reaction times, followed by the analysis of accuracy
data. The descriptive statistics for reaction times and
accuracy are reported in Table 3.
Reaction time. Overall, responses were very accu-
rate (M = 95.3%, SD = 8.6%). Mean reaction times are
displayed in Figure 3(a). We included only correct
responses in the analyses of reaction times. A linear
regression model was built within a repeated
measure general linear model framework, to
compare overall response times across and within
experimental conditions. Task (prosody/face/verbal
content) and congruence condition (congruent
prosody–face/congruent prosody–verbal content/
congruent face–verbal content/cross-channel congru-
ence control) were entered as within-subject



































predictors. Reaction times were entered as the depen-
dent variable.
The model revealed a significant main effect of task
(Wald χ2 (2) = 127.285, p < .001), a significant main
effect of congruence condition (Wald χ2 (3) =
10.2485, p = .017), and no significant interaction
between task and congruence condition (Wald χ2 (6)
= 4.393, p = .624). All pairwise comparisons were com-
puted using the sequential Bonferroni correction pro-
cedure (Holm, 1979). Pairwise comparisons between
Table 3. Experiment 2: Reaction time (milliseconds) and accuracy (% correct) for the different tasks and congruence conditions.
Reaction time Accuracy
Task Congruence condition Min Max Mean
Standard
deviation Min Max Mean
Standard
deviation
Face Cross-channel 527.850 1691.615 983.545 315.416 75 100 98.75 5.590
Prosody–verbal
content
510.275 1695.783 964.018 337.485 62.5 100 91.25 10.806
Prosody–face 534.179 1877.267 1010.862 380.598 87.5 100 98.125 4.579
Face–verbal content 592.487 1754.187 1003.541 375.069 75 100 97.5 6.539
Verbal
content
Cross-channel 955.973 1885.545 1391.243 254.049 87.5 100 98.75 3.847
Prosody–verbal
content
972.056 2008.672 1368.101 251.056 62.5 100 96.25 9.158
Prosody–face 1003.972 2044.109 1481.164 284.279 75 100 91.25 9.158
Face–verbal content 980.379 2023.217 1420.841 264.264 62.5 100 91.875 10.938
Prosody Cross-channel 869.899 1948.171 1320.338 321.236 87.5 100 98.75 3.847
Prosody–verbal
content
955.384 1944.015 1385.575 277.292 62.5 100 95.625 9.314
Prosody–face 1003.367 2897.121 1429.764 427.348 87.5 100 97.5 5.129
Face–verbal content 784.405 1866.477 1413.809 283.258 62.5 100 88.75 12.098
Figure 3. Experiment 2 – (a) Reaction times for the face task, the prosody task, and the verbal content task, averaged across participants. (b)
Percentage of correct answers for the face task, the prosody task, and the verbal content task, averaged across participants. Results are
shown separately for each congruence condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



































task conditions revealed a significant difference
between face and prosody tasks (Mean Difference I–
J (1) = 0.396, SE = 0.045, p < .001, d =−1.175) and
between face and verbal content tasks (Mean Differ-
ence I–J (1) = 0.424, SE = 0.037, p < .001, d =−1.384).
No significant difference was found between
prosody and verbal content tasks (Mean Difference
I–J (1) = 0.027, SE = 0.020, p = .337). Pairwise compari-
sons between congruence conditions and the cross-
channel congruence control across tasks revealed a
significant difference between the congruent
prosody–face condition and the cross-channel con-
gruence control (Wald χ2 (1) = 9.308, p = .007, d =
0.198) and between the congruent face–verbal
content condition and the cross-channel congruence
control (Wald χ2 (1) = 5.866, p = .031, d = 0.023).
These results provide evidence that in the face task,
emotions were identified significantly faster than in
the prosody and in the verbal content tasks. The
inclusion of faces as a third emotional channel in
this task levelled out the reaction time differences
between the prosody and verbal content tasks
detected in experiment 1. We observed slower reac-
tion times in the congruent prosody–face and in the
congruent face–verbal content conditions, but not in
the congruent prosody–verbal content as compared
to the cross-channel congruence control across tasks.
Accuracy. The same model used to analyse reaction
times as a function of task and congruence was
applied, with the only difference that the percentage
of correct responses was entered as the dependent
variable. Mean percentages of correct responses are
displayed in Figure 3(b). The model revealed no sig-
nificant effect of task (Wald χ2 (2) = 4.505, p = .105), a
significant main effect of congruence condition
(Wald χ2 (3) = 39.725, p < .001), and a significant inter-
action between task and congruence condition (Wald
χ2 (6) = 22.973, p = .001). Pairwise comparisons
between the cross-channel congruence control and
all the other congruence conditions were conducted
within each task separately, using the sequential Bon-
ferroni correction procedure (Holm, 1979). Within the
face task, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant
difference between congruent prosody–verbal
content and cross-channel congruence control (Wald
χ2 (1) = 8.571, p = .010, d =−0.875). Within the
prosody task, pairwise comparisons between congru-
ence conditions and the cross-channel congruence
control revealed a significant difference between con-
gruent face–verbal content and cross-channel congru-
ence control (Wald χ2 (1) = 12.075, p = .002, d =
−1.123). Within the verbal content task, pairwise com-
parisons revealed a significant difference between
congruent prosody–face and cross-channel congru-
ence control (Wald χ2 (1) = 16.364, p < .001, d =
−1.075), and between congruent face–verbal
content and cross-channel congruence control (Wald
χ2 (1) = 8.094, p = .009, d =−0.845).
These results provide evidence that accuracy rate is
comparable across all the attended channels we
adopted in this experiment. Within each task con-
dition, participants responded less accurately when
the combination of any two channels was expressing
an emotion that was incongruent with the attended
channel, in comparison to the cross-channel congru-
ence control.
Crucially, inspection of the congruence condition
results shows that in the verbal content task, accuracy
was significantly lower in the congruent prosody–
face condition (where two channels were incongru-
ent to the attended one) but also in the congruent
face–verbal content condition, as compared to the
cross-channel congruence control. The congruent
face–verbal content effect is particularly striking as
it suggests that in the verbal content task, accuracy
was lower than in the cross-channel congruence
control not only when verbal content (the attended
channel) was incongruent to the other two channels,
but also when prosody was incongruent to both
verbal content and face. This result suggests that
prosody biases responses in the process of identify-
ing the emotion conveyed by verbal content, even
when verbal content and face are both simul-
taneously expressing an emotion that is incongruent
with the one expressed by prosody.
These data converge with, and extend the findings
from experiment 1. The integration of reaction time
and accuracy data suggests that, although processed
significantly faster than prosody and verbal content,
faces alone are not sufficient to interfere in emotion
identification within a three-dimensional Stroop task.
Faces and verbal content biased the process of
emotion identification across tasks only when congru-
ent with one of the other two channels. In contrast,
prosody alone was sufficient to interfere against the
combination of congruent face and verbal content,
affecting accuracy in the verbal content task. This
suggests that, in a task where emotions are simul-
taneously communicated by prosody, verbal content,
and face – prosody exploits selective attentional
resources within the process of identifying the
emotion conveyed by verbal content.




































Humans typically combine two sources of information
to comprehend emotions expressed in spoken inter-
actions: linguistic, that is, verbal content, and nonlin-
guistic (e.g. body posture, facial expression, prosody,
and pragmatic context). Prior studies on emotion pro-
cessing using Stroop paradigms have shown that
prosody, face, and verbal content influence each
other (De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Ishii et al., 2003;
Kitayama & Ishii, 2002; Nygaard & Queen, 2008; Schir-
mer & Kotz, 2003; Stenberg et al., 1998; Wurm &
Douglas, 1996; Wurm et al., 2004), but have mainly
focused on the interaction between two of these
three dimensions (for instance, prosody and verbal
content, or verbal content and faces). Furthermore,
these studies used words judged for emotional
valence rather than words directly denoting emotions
as the verbal content channel. In our study, we
adopted emotions as denotations that were signalled
across multiple channels simultaneously.
In experiment 1, we tested a Stroop effect of happy
and sad voice prosody over synonyms of “happy” and
“sad”. Experiment 1 indicated an interference effect for
prosody in terms of accuracy rate. This result confirms
earlier findings (Nygaard & Queen, 2008; Schirmer &
Kotz, 2003) indicating that prosody recruits selective
attention in verbal content processing. Moreover,
our findings align with data from behavioural and
brain studies suggesting that prosody elicits auto-
matic responses in emotion processing, affecting
verbal content processing (Mitchell, 2006; Schirmer &
Kotz, 2003; Wildgruber et al., 2006).
In experiment 2, we extended the Stroop paradigm
to an interference task where three emotion channels,
specifically verbal content, prosody, and face, are simul-
taneously included. We thus simulated the complexity
of ambiguous multimodal emotive communication
using, for the first time in this research paradigm,
three communicative channels within an interference
task. Adopting stimuli that denote specific emotions
enabled the examination of how the three different
channels interact in conveying emotion-specific infor-
mation, that is, the denotations “happy” and “sad”, to
the listeners at test. Importantly, findings from exper-
iment 2 suggest that, while faces and verbal content
interfered significantly with other channels only when
they were in combination with a congruent channel
(i.e. when the attended channel was incongruent to
the other two channels), prosody alone was sufficient
to interfere with both other channels when it was
incongruent in the verbal content task. Notably, in
experiment 2, reaction time and accuracy data did
not mirror. The differences in these two analyses
suggest that in the face task, the presence of two chan-
nels that are incongruent to face is strong enough to
inhibit accuracy, but not to affect reaction time, and
that in the verbal task, prosody alone is sufficient to
inhibit accuracy, although it does not affect reaction
times. This result warrants investigation at a neurobio-
logical level. It might be that multimodal emotional
processing results from the integration of multiple,
independent sub-processes working in parallel (see
Ho, Schröger, & Kotz, 2015) and that, if incongruent
with both face and verbal content, prosody recruits
selective attentional resources for identifying the
emotion expressed by the incongruent verbal content.
Previous work has investigated emotion recog-
nition in unimodal communication, providing evi-
dence for the dominance of visual channels
(specifically, of face expression and written words)
over prosody in facilitating the recognition of
disgust, happiness, surprise, and neutral expression
(Paulmann & Pell, 2011). In the same study, prosody
was found to be dominant over the visual channels
for the recognition of sadness. Our work provides
quantitative data on the perceptual saliency of
prosody within a task where multiple congruent or
incongruent emotions were expressed simultaneously
through face, verbal content, and prosody. Our find-
ings confirm and extend those of previous work in
the field, indicating that emotional prosody provides
a specific conceptual space that biases verbal
content processing (Nygaard et al., 2009; Nygaard &
Queen, 2008; Paulmann & Kotz, 2008), also in those
cases where prosody is incongruous to both face
and verbal content at the same time. Crucially, the
pattern of results in both experiments is independent
of any perceptual expectation, as the combination of
the emotions expressed by the two (for experiment 1)
or three (for experiment 2) channels, as well as the
attended channel was randomly varied across trials.
Furthermore, our findings on the effect of congru-
ence conditions in both experiment 1 and 2 comp-
lements findings from emotional priming research,
which suggest that cross-modal congruence facilitates
emotion processing (Nygaard & Lunders, 2002; Pell,
2002, 2005; Pell et al., 2011; Schwartz & Pell, 2012),
but partially contrasts with data from Ishii et al.
(2003), which indicate that Americans are more
attuned to verbal content rather than to prosody in
emotion valence judgments. As Ishii et al. (2003)



































themselves argued, this inconsistency might be due to
cultural differences in emotional information proces-
sing – in this case between Germans and Americans.
Another possible explanation is that their study con-
sisted of words with emotional valence rather than
words denoting specific emotions. Future studies
could examine differences in processing emotion
words and emotional valences of non-emotion
words, and cultural differences among further popu-
lations. Indeed, population sample, task design, and
specific stimuli material used seem to be crucial in
determining the extent of cross-channel interference
(see Paulmann & Kotz, 2008).
Traditional models of lexical access and recognition
have not typically recognised this crucial influential
role of prosody in language processing (Ganong,
1980; Marslen-Wilson, 1987; McClelland & Elman,
1986; Morton, 1969). Conversely, one fundamental
implication of our study is that a nonlinguistic dimen-
sion of communication, prosody, is remarkably impor-
tant for online emotion word processing, since it
biases the activation of specific emotional meaning
representations. Intriguingly, the congruent prosodic
modulation of verbal content or sentences conveying
emotions can be considered a special case where lin-
guistic and nonlinguistic channels refer to the same
denotation (Nygaard et al., 2009).
Although the present study focused on two
emotions (sad and happy) as denotations, it might
be the case that other emotions are processed differ-
ently across communication channels and modalities.
Within this research frame, future work could apply
our experimental design to more emotions. Further-
more, based on our findings, we cannot exclude the
existence of specific biases given by timing asymme-
tries between channels in the process of emotion rec-
ognition. For instance, it is plausible that prosody is
detected earlier than the other channels, biasing
decisions on the emotion conveyed by verbal
content or face. Future research on behavioural and
electrophysiological responses should address differ-
ences in processing timings between channels (see
Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003; Pell et al., 2011;
Scott, O’Donnell, Leuthold, & Sereno, 2009). This
would further clarify the effect of each channel in
the process of emotion recognition, pinpointing
channel-specific biases. In addition, it is advisable for
future studies to adopt highly sensitive response
devices as suggested in Plant and Turner (2009).
This work could be further improved by also taking
semantic and pragmatic concerns into account
(Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Wilson & Wharton,
2006), and by adopting dynamic videos of faces time-
synchronised with their voice, a feature that would
permit examination of whether multimodal integration
in emotional processing induces effects comparable to
the McGurk illusion (Fagel, 2006; McGurk & MacDonald,
1976). In addition, due to the nature of our stimuli
(which had to be recognised as expressing the same
discrete emotion, at the same emotional intensity
across channels in the validation experiment), the
number of trials in our experiments was constrained
to a limited number. Future studies adopting our exper-
imental frame should include a higher number of
stimuli to investigate interference effects across and
within different communication channels.
Our findings on the salient role of prosody within
contexts of cross-channel discrepancies is essential
to understand what sensory cues favour the correct
interpretation of ambiguous communications, includ-
ing sarcastic, humorous or ironic messages (see Cutler,
1974). Furthermore, the investigation of the relative
saliency and processing speed of communication
channels within multimodal communicative situations
might be applied to improve man–machine communi-
cation paradigms.
From an evolutionary perspective, our data fit with
the hypothesis that the ability to communicate
emotions through prosodic modulation of the voice
– which appears to be dominant over verbal content
– is evolutionary older than the emergence of seg-
mental articulation (Fitch, 2010; Mithen, 2005). In line
with this hypothesis, quantitative data suggest that
prosody has a vital role in the perception of well-
formed words (Johnson & Jusczyk, 2001), in the
ability to map sounds to referential meanings
(Filippi, Gingras, & Fitch, 2014), and in syntactic disam-
biguation (Soderstrom, Seidl, Nelson, & Jusczyk, 2003).
This research could complement studies on iconic
communication within visual and auditory domains.
Further work aimed at how emotional cues from
different communication channels are integrated sim-
ultaneously will favour a better understanding of how
humans interpret emotional contents in real-life inter-
actions. Importantly, this research paradigm could
provide crucial insights on what makes humans’
ability to communicate unique.
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Appendix 1: Stimuli validation procedure
for experiments 1 and 2
Stimuli material was developed in two steps. First, we
prepared sets of stimuli for each communication
channel: verbal content, prosody and, for experiment
2, faces. The verbal content set consisted of 42 items
(21 synonyms of “happy” and 21 synonyms of “sad”).
The prosody stimuli set was built as follows: three
male and three female lay actors recorded the 42
stimuli in happy and sad prosody. The actors were
German native speakers. All stimuli were recorded in a
quiet laboratory setting with a Stagg MD-500 Dynamic
microphone at a 44.100 kHz sampling rate. Faces con-
sisted of colour photographs of 8 females and 10
males’ unobstructed facial expression (Pell, 2002).
Second, we developed a validation experiment
with the aim to adopt only stimuli that convey the
emotion of interest, that is, happy or sad, and to be
able to associate stimuli with the same emotional
intensity across communication channels, in each
trial. For this validation experiment, a group of 24
native speakers of German (12 females, mean age:
26, 29) rated the emotional content and arousal inten-
sity of a large set of stimuli within three communi-
cation channels: verbal content, prosody, face.
Participants were instructed to identify the emotion
expressed by (i) the verbal content displayed in
written text, (ii) the intonation of the verbal contents
played as spoken stimuli, and (iii) each face as
“happy” or “sad” within a two-choice task. Participants
also rated each item’s emotional intensity on a 7-point
Likert scale (0 = not intense, 6 = very intense). The
order of the experimental blocks (verbal content,
prosody and face) was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. The collected rating values for the selected
stimuli are reported in Table A1.



































Appendix 2: Spoken stimuli used in experiments 1 and 2.
Table A1. Emotional intensity ratings collected in a separate
validation experiment for the stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Stimulus type Emotion Mean Standard deviation
Face Happy 3.595 0.703
Sad 3.096 0.600
Prosody Happy 3.543 0.770
Sad 2.479 0.520
Verbal content Happy 3.496 0.652
Sad 3.314 0.643
Note: Participants rated each item’s emotional intensity on a 7-point
Likert scale (0 = not intense, 6 = very intense).
Prosody
Happy Sad
Male speaker Female speaker Male speaker Female speaker
Verbal content Happy Beseelt (enlivened) Begeistert (excited) Fröhlich (cheerful) Heiter (carefree)
Hoffnungsfroh (hopeful) Glücklich (happy) Lustig (funny) Vergnügt (jolly)
Ausgelassen (frolic) Freudig (joyful) Erfreut (delighted) Munter (chipper)
Beschwingt (elated) Erheitert (amused) Motiviert (motivated) Unbeschwert (happy-go-lucky)
Sad Bekümmert (distressed) Verbittert (embittered) Schmerzlich (grievous) Jammernd (wailing)
Trübselig (cheerless) Traurig (sad) Kummervoll (sorrowful) Klagend (moanful)
Trostlos (desolate) Bedrückt (aggrieved) Betrübt (unhappy) Betroffen (sorrow-stricken)
Deprimiert (depressed) Freudlos (joyless) Geknickt (broken) Verzagt (disheartened)
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